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JOHN D. FAIBSIY
PENOBSCOT, 1779 
T H E  EYE OF A HURRICANE
Two h u n d red  years ago the U nited States suffered a 
devastating naval defeat, the worst o f the American 
Revolution, at the m outh o f the Penobscot River on the 
Maine coast. An American flotilla o f forty-four vessels, 
sent to dislodge a small British expeditionary force 
supported by three sloops-of-war, met a shattering defeat 
in Penobscot Bay and on the Penobscot River. This 
debacle, in which the Com monwealth o f Massachusetts 
wasted a fleet and  a fo rtu n e , p roved  o f u tm ost 
consequence in determ ining the fu rth e r course o f a 
forgotten Yankee struggle to bring the British-held 
province o f Nova Scotia into the American union. T he 
present w riter wishes to focus upon the im portance o f the 
Penobscot campaign in relationship to that forgotten 
contest, waged in the wilderness o f New Brunswick and 
northern  New England. Unless Penobscot is exam ined 
within the context of this struggle, the military and 
psychological consequences o f the defeat cannot be fully 
understood.
Additionally, this w riter wishes to pu t forw ard the 
argum ent that the British trium ph was, in a very real 
sense, a failure, for the victors were thw arted in obtaining 
a m ajor objective. His Majesty’s G overnm ent had long 
realized the need for acquiring a strategic post in Eastern 
Massachusetts, also known as Maine, which would serve as 
a base of operations against Yankee privateers roam ing 
Fundy Bay and the G ulf o f Maine. Frustrated royal 
ministers and their representatives in Halifax hoped that 
the British counterstroke at Penobscot would result in 
crown control o f icy waters o ff Maine and Nova Scotia. In 
this aim, however, they rem ained disappointed. While the
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British success off the Maine coast in m id-1779 did signal a 
decrease in American privateering in Yankee waters, the 
decline represented only a brief respite for the victims of 
this privateering, a reprieve which, this writer hopes to 
show, they would have received irrespective o f the Royal 
Navy’s accomplishment at Penobscot Bay.
T he battle for Penobscot began on Ju n e  17, 1779, when 
a British military party o f six vessels and 750 Highland 
regulars, com m anded by Brigadier-G eneral Francis 
Maclean, arrived from  Halifax. In  addition to securing an 
outpost in New England to operate against privateers, 
Whitehall officials wanted that area o f Maine east of the 
Kennebec River to serve as a bulwark of protection for 
Quebec and Nova Scotia, two colonies which had 
previously repelled American-sponsored intrusions but 
whose restive inhabitants the crown continued to mistrust. 
While English naval officers foresaw an im portant supply 
station in the region for their men-of-war, Tory refugees 
hoped to establish there a Loyalist colony called New 
Ire land .1 T he attention o f British officials and Loyalists 
alike focused upon the Bagaduce2 peninsula, projecting 
from  the northern  shores of Penobscot Bay and com­
m anding all sea approaches to that estuary.
While Maclean’s men dug in at Bagaduce and began 
constructing a stronghold nam ed Fort George in honor of 
the king, news of their arrival spread throughout New 
England.3 W ithout consulting Continental authorities, the 
Massachusetts governm ent took immediate steps to fit 
out an expeditionary force to expel the redcoats before 
they became securely en trenched .4 Leadership of the 
expedition went to Brigadier-General Solomon Lovell, 
com m ander o f the Suffolk, Massachusetts militia, with 
Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Revere taking charge o f the 
artillery tra in .5 C om m odore Dudley Saltonstall, a 
well-known Continental navy officer from  New London, 
Connecticut, received orders to com m and the fleet.6
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Raising a large naval force to dislodge the Britons 
proved a formidable task for the men of Massachusetts. 
Many m ariners were privateersm en who m anned their 
vessels in pursuit o f spoils ra ther than wages; these 
undisciplined seamen showed considerable reluctance to 
jo in  an invasion fleet com prised almost entirely o f 
Massachusetts state vessels, and to take part in a campaign 
on such short notice. To encourage them  to partake in the 
expedition, the Massachusetts governm ent proclaimed 
that it would not share directly or indirectly in any prizes 
taken by the Yankee arm ada.7 W hen some Bay State 
sailors still hesitated to participate, however, officials 
quickly ordered  the im pressm ent o f both seamen and 
arm ed vessels.8
O n July 19, less than four weeks after Massachusetts 
authorities had first learned of Maclean’s presence, a task 
force of m ore than forty transports and arm ed vessels 
sailed from Boston H arbor. T hree days later it anchored 
at Townsend (now Boothbay H arbor, Maine), sixty miles 
below the Penobscot R iver.9 British com m anders, 
receiving intelligence of Yankee movements almost 
daily,10 redoubled their efforts at Bagaduce. General 
Maclean o rdered  his troops, now assisted by seamen and 
Loyalists, to hasten their construction of Fort George.11 
Captain H enry Mowat, the English naval officer who had 
burned Falm outh (Portland, Maine) in the autum n of 
1775 and who had m ore recently escorted the redcoats to 
Penobscot, stationed his three sloops-of-war — Albany, 
Nautilus and North — across the narrow mouth of 
Bagaduce H arbor to bar the entrance of the Yankee 
fleet.12 He fu rth e r ordered  three transports to run afoul 
o f any American vessels attem pting to penetrate the 
harb o r.13
D uring these continuing British preparations, the 
Americans arrived o ff Penobscot. Late on the afternoon of 
July 25 nine American vessels in three divisions engaged
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the king's sloops while General Lovell unsuccessfully 
attem pted to establish a beachhead. A fter a b rief exchange 
o f cannonade which dam aged only the rigging of the 
British vessels, the Yankees ceased firing and dropped 
anchor down the bay.14
O n the following day, while the opposing fleets again 
exchanged fire, two h undred  New Englanders landed on 
Nautilus Island, situated in the m iddle o f Penobscot Bay, 
ousted twenty Royal marines and seized some British 
artillery pieces.15 Although action stagnated on July 27, 
the next day American m arines and militiamen, protected 
by a shroud o f fog and cannonade, landed on the 
peninsula. But they soon found themselves unable to 
storm the fort. Confined to a narrow  neck o f land, the 
Yankees watched helplessly as British and American war­
ships battled furiously nearby. D uring this engagem ent 
the Continental frigate Warren, Com m odore Saltonstall’s 
flagship, received considerable damage. H er mainmast, 
forestay and gam m oning took the b ru n t o f the enemy’s 
fire .16
D uring the next two weeks the American fleet rem ained 
bewilderingly inactive: it dared  only m aneuver about the 
m outh of the Penobscot River and sporadically engage the 
British. Although Saltonstall possessed overwhelming 
naval superiority, he refused to contest Mowat’s position at 
the entrance to the harbor. Admittedly, he mistrusted 
many of his own captains who showed little inclination to 
partake in a full-scale assault.17 I f  the cautious commodore 
had engaged the British naval force — as General Lovell 
had constantly entreated — the Yankees could have seized 
Fort George. But so long as the British warships rem ained 
in the harbor, they could pin down the American ground 
forces by a concentrated fire.18
T he more Saltonstall dallied, the more an anxious 
General Lovell realized that the tide o f battle moved
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against him. T he inhabitants o f Penobscot, many of them 
Loyalists, responded coolly to his proclam ation o f July 29, 
which urged that they come over to the American side and 
prom ised amnesty for those who did so.19 Both officers 
and enlisted men expressed growing concern over the 
course o f the cam paign.20 Each day brought reports that 
British naval reinforcem ents from New York would soon 
appear on the horizon.21
By August 11 Lovell had determ ined on the necessity 
for immediate action if the New Englanders still hoped to 
take the fort. He pleaded with Saltonstall:
I mean not to determ ine on your m ode of attack; but it appears to me so 
very practicable, that any farther delay must be infamous; and I have it 
this m om ent by a deserter from  one of their ships, that the m om ent you 
en ter the harbou r they will destroy them  . . .22
Yet Saltonstall had dawdled too long. Before he could 
commit his fleet to an all-out assault, Sir George Collier 
appeared with naval reinforcem ents from Sandy Hook. 
O n August 14 his British squadron bore down on the 
Americans who, in their fright, had already evacuated 
their positions on Bagaduce and Nautilus Island. Collier’s 
w arships easily overw helm ed two Y ankee vessels 
attem pting to escape down the bay; the rem aining 
American craft fled up the Penobscot River pursued by 
the British fleet. Collier captured some o f the Yankee 
transports. Those he did not went to the bottom anyway, 
scuttled and burned  by their own crews, who then fled 
inland to safety.23 “Since their Defeat,” Sir George Collier 
noted with satisfaction immediately after his victory, "the 
Americans have quarelled am ongst themselves, and 
fought, by which between 50 and 60 Men are slain.”24
Rebels squabbling over responsibility for the rout 
concentrated their ire on their form er leaders, most 
o f  w hom  lacked fam iliarity  w ith the battlefie ld . 
Brigadier-G eneral Solomon Lovell, for instance, was an
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inexperienced leader of militiamen who enjoyed im­
portant political connections in Massachusetts and an 
unimpressive battle record skirmishing with redcoats in 
Rhode Island. His com m ander o f the artillery, Paul 
Revere, is best rem em bered for his m idnight ride in 
Lexington in April 1775 to alert his countrym en of British 
troop movements. Charges made against the American 
hero after the Penobscot fiasco represen t him as being 
more concerned with his personal safety and possessions 
than with the safety o f his compatriots. Most serious of 
these accusations was the deposition o f General Peleg 
W adsworth to the Com mittee of Inquiry established by 
the state o f Massachusetts to investigate Penobscot. 
W adsworth testified that Revere disobeyed a direct o rder 
by com m andeering a barge to transport him self and his 
personal luggage ra ther than using the vessel to rescue 
seamen from  a disabled American schooner. “I asked 
h im /’ fum ed W adsworth, “w hether he came there [to 
Penobscot] to take Care o f his private Baggage o r to serve 
the state.”25
Paul Revere m anaged to clear him self against the 
charges made against him. Less fortunate was Dudley 
Saltonstall, the indecisive American naval com m ander, 
whom the Committee o f  Inquiry found lacking in “p ro p er 
spirit and energy,” and rightfully placed most o f the 
responsibility for the calamity on him. Saltonstalfs own 
testimony served to underscore the Connecticut m an’s 
timidity and im potence in battle. Asked at his trial why he 
had not bom barded a British warship at Penobscot, 
Saltonstall replied limply: “I f  I had fired, then  the enemy 
would have fired back.” Saltonstall him self was fired, the 
cashiered com m odore being held by the Committee of 
Inquiry as “ever after” incom petent to hold a governm ent 
office o r state post.26
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Pitted against these unheroic chiefs were seasoned 
British fighters. Brigadier-G eneral Francis Maclean was a 
zealous and resourceful com m ander whose tenacity in war 
had  previously been dem onstrated in campaigns in 
Europe, British N orth America and the Caribbean: his 
stubbornness in opposing the French in the Netherlands 
early in his long career had w rung praise from  his chief 
adversary, who granted  him imm ediate parole upon his 
cap tu re.27 Com m odore Sir George Collier and Henry 
Mowat, brilliant seamen for the crown, had long served 
the Royal Navy and possessed a familiarity with New 
England waters which surpassed that o f most Yankee 
m ariners.28
If  lapse in leadership contributed in large measure to 
the plight o f the provincials at Bagaduce, the quality and 
size o f the opposing forces fu rth er indicated weaknesses 
in the Am erican position. While the New Englanders 
enjoyed, on paper, overwhelming naval superiority, their 
fleet was m anned by sullen privateersm en who had jo ined  
the task force un d er threat o f impressment. Moreover, 
naval strength alone did not decide the outcome at 
Penobscot. A large American ground force acting with 
greater vigor at the beginning o f the campaign might have 
taken Fort George. But General Lovell could m uster at the 
height of the battle only 950 soldiers, many of whom were 
inexperienced militiamen unable to coordinate military 
attacks with the rowdy seamen of the Yankee fleet. His 
British coun terpart could rely upon 750 Scottish regulars, 
tough soldiers o f an army respected by the Americans for 
its discipline.29 Additionally, the British defenders of Fort 
George could draw auxiliaries from  three hundred  
seamen in H enry Mowat’s squadron. So desperate was 
Lovell for American reinforcem ents that he dem anded 
during  battle that Machias, a small Yankee outpost near 
the Nova Scotia border, send its militia to Bagaduce. But 
Colonel Jo h n  Allan, com m anding the Machias militiamen,
98
simply refused to comply with the o rder because British 
men-of-war lurking in nearby waters threatened his 
base.30
Lack o f an adequate line of communications worked 
against the Continentals th roughout the expedition. Since 
250 miles o f roadless wilderness separated Boston from 
Bagaduce, New England authorities failed to grasp 
immediately the seriousness o f Lovell’s situation. Only on 
August 8, 1779, after several transports had brought 
u rgen t requests fo r troop reinforcem ents at Penobscot, 
did Yankee officials determ ine to reinforce Lovell with 
the Massachusetts regim ent o f Colonel H enry Jackson.31 
Poor roads, however, delayed these auxiliaries in their 
march from  western Massachusetts to the capital.32 
Consequently, they did not sail from  Boston until August 
14, the same day that Sir George Collier scattered the 
American fleet at Bagaduce.33
Inaccurate reports prevented the Massachusetts gov­
ernm ent from  realizing immediately the extent of the 
rebel defeat. H oping that Lovell m ight be able to regroup 
his battered forces and make a stand, officials continued to 
dispatch provision vessels to Maine. But the threat of 
British warships and Loyalist privateers cruising in the 
G ulf of Maine rem ained a serious obstacle. Detailed 
instructions from  the Massachusetts War Office for 
avoiding enemy craft fu rth er slowed down attem pts by the 
provision vessels to locate Lovell’s retreating troops.34
Insurm ountable logistics problem s combined with a lack 
of leadership and a hastily-assembled expeditionary force 
had resulted in the Yankee debacle at Penobscot, the 
greatest American naval defeat o f the Revolution. In 
one stroke G reat Britain had secured a sanctuary for dis­
placed Loyalists and a base to supply her men-of-war. 
Additionally, the rebel rou t at Bagaduce proved to be of 
great consequence in another arena of Revolutionary
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warfare: it represented a watershed in the struggle 
between downeast republicans and agents of the crown for 
control of the tottering colony of Nova Scotia.
T hat struggle had begun in the spring o f 1775 when 
patriots in Machias, the Maine outpost of radicalism, 
seized the British arm ed schooner Margaretta in the first 
naval contest of the Revolutionary War. T he Machias 
militants argued vigorously for an arm ed force to invade 
the neighboring province of Nova Scotia, whose New 
England settlers, they claimed, were eager to cast their lot 
with the Americans. “I ask for a small army to subdue 
Nova Scotia,” the chairm an of the Committee o f Safety for 
Machias exhorted, “o r at least that some person or persons 
be given leave to raise men to go against that province at 
their own risk.”35
T he Machias notion that a Nova Scotia verging upon 
arm ed rebellion lay within the grasp of an American 
expeditionary force received strong support from both 
friends and foes o f the Yankee cause. His Majesty’s 
harried  governor at Halifax, Francis Legge, complained 
bitterly at the beginning of the war that his New England 
subjects, who dom inated the population, were plotting to 
tu rn  his colony into another Massachusetts. Concluded the 
unhappy Legge: “we lay open to the Country on every 
side, the Batteries are dism antled, the Carriages of the 
Guns all decayed Sc they [are] lying on the G round.”36 
Firebrands in western Nova Scotia (now New Brunswick) 
gave nourishm ent to the governor's ravenous appre­
hensions when they, like their neighbors in Machias, 
form ed Committees o f Safety and appealed for American 
military assistance.37 This downeast enthusiasm  for the 
republican banner seemed form idable even late in the 
war. T he entry o f France into the conflict brought rum ors 
o f Count d ’Estaign’s squadron assisting the rebels in “New 
Scotland,” whose settlers, Lloyd's Evening Post declared,
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rem ained “disposed to unite themselves with the United 
States of Am erica.”38 Reverend Jacob Bailey, the Loyalist 
missionary who fled from Maine to Nova Scotia on the eve 
of the battle for Penobscot, found strong pockets of 
republicanism in the colony in 1780. Defeat of American 
forces and their allies upon various battlefields failed to 
shake these diehard dissidents, and indeed had often 
worked the reverse by entrenching their radicalism even 
more strongly. On one occasion, after a French naval 
defeat, the scandalized Bailey reported  that
m ultitudes in these regions of Whiggism are ready to expire with 
vexation and chagrin . . .  I heard  a lady last evening declare before 
Capt. Campbell, that she wished and prayed fo r the arrival o f the 
french to conquer this province — oh, the im pudence, the ingratitude, 
and malice, the nonsense of republican radicals.39
Nova Scotia’s “im pudence” towards King George 
seemed most pervasive during  the first years o f the war, 
when the colony lacked a strong garrison to repel invasion. 
Nova Scotia insurgents, assembling at Machias, jo ined  
with the militants there to plot their mischief. These 
com rades-in-arms determ ined to invade the province by 
land and wean it away from  Britain, in spite of a decided 
lack o f support evinced by General George W ashington, 
the Continental Congress and the Massachusetts General 
Court, all o f whom faced burdensom e problems else­
where. Indeed, the radicals made several incursions into 
Nova Scotia in 1776 and 1777, penetrating as far as 
the River Saint Jo h n  in western Nova Scotia and the 
Isthm us o f Chignecto. However, a disastrous “siege” of 
B ritish-held  F ort C um berland  on the isthm us in 
November 1776 concluded with em barrassed revolu­
tionaries fleeing westward towards the Saint John  River 
and Machias.40
While the bungled attack on Fort Cum berland proved 
to be a failure from  which the revolutionary movement in 
Nova Scotia never fully recovered, neither the radicals nor
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the British immediately recognized it as such. In  January  
1777 the Royal Council o f Halifax received “very 
authentic Intelligence” that the men of Machias again 
planned an invasion, this time “under the Protection of the 
Pirate Frigate Alfred & o ther arm ’d vessels.” T he Council 
resolved to send warships of the Royal Navy to Machias to 
counter the th rea t.41 Accordingly, Sir George Collier’s 
squadron assailed Machias in mid-August, destroying 
magazines there as well as large quantities o f flour, rice, 
tan n ed  lea th e r hides and  shoes.42 Following the 
bom bardm ent, Collier sailed along the rugged coast of 
Maine and New Ham pshire, entering enemy harbors, 
capturing rebel vessels and burning Yankee forts.43 Two 
years before his masterstroke at Penobscot the Briton had 
already im pressed upon downeasters his zeal in defending 
the interests of the crown.
If  calamitous defeats in 1776 and 1777 had precluded 
the possibility of revolution in New England’s northern  
neighbor, the determ ined republicans of Maine and 
Massachusetts refused to acknowledge that Nova Scotia 
had slipped beyond their military grasp. While the best 
chance for a Yankee success against the colony had come 
early in the war, the general military situation in North 
America, at least until Burgoyne’s defeat, favored the 
British. After the stunning rebel victory at Saratoga in late 
1777, with the resultant Franco-American Alliance, the 
initiative rested with the Continentals. British war leaders, 
recognizing that New England could not be split from its 
fellow colonies to the south, again feared for the safety of 
Nova Scotia. Keen American strategists realized the futility 
o f fu rth er downeast schemes, but New England dissenters 
and even Congress had retained sufficient bluster to issue 
challenges to the Halifax governm ent. In early 1777, 
shortly after the Fort Cum berland fiasco, the Continental 
Congress em powered Massachusetts to raise “a body of 
men not exceeding three thousand” to em bark against
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Nova Scotia “in the course o f the winter or early in the 
sp rin g ,”44 T his con tinu ing  R evolutionary bravado 
rekindled British anxieties. In London, Lloyd's Evening 
Post, for example, reported  at the beginning of 1778 that 
General Benedict A rnold and 14,000 provincials had 
m arched for the peninsular outpost.45 T he Boston press 
boasted in the spring o f 1779 that Halifax rem ained 
“under great A pprehensions of an invasion from the 
Americans.”46 Psychologically, it appears that many 
republicans showed a surprising stubbornness in refusing 
to write off Nova Scotia. Indeed, the American bombast 
directed against His Majesty’s representatives in Halifax 
proved a m ajor factor in the British form ulation o f an 
invasion at Penobscot.
T he British victory of Maclean and Collier at Bagaduce 
brought to a close not only the rem aining possibility of a 
military attack on Nova Scotia but also all hopes, however 
illusory, o f a push in that direction. T he com m ander of 
the Machias militia, Colonel John  Allan, himself a 
republican refugee from  Nova Scotia, recognized im­
mediately the significance o f the battle. “T he U nhappy 
and U nparalleled Defeat at Penobscot,” he observed, “has 
pu t this D epartm ent in a most Critical &: Dangerous 
Situation, such as Requires the most vigilant attention for 
its Preservation.”47 Allan and his cohorts had foreseen 
Machias as an advance base for northern  invasion. With 
Britain established at Fort George, however, the patriots 
found themselves effectively isolated from  the Boston 
supply line and constricted by an English vise with jaws 
to their south and east. W henever Allan attem pted to 
rekindle downeast republicanism, even in Maine shore 
towns, the Royal Navy now dispatched arm ed vessels to 
the threatened seaports.48 Bagaduce was the last major 
battle of the Revolution fought in New England: while the 
enfeebled Maine dissidents continued resistance for the
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rem ainder o f the war, their mission now was not a Nova 
Scotia conquest but retention of a residue o f Eastern 
Massachusetts.
T he Penobscot catastrophe served to underscore a shift 
in Yankee impressions of Nova Scotia, previously held by 
downeasters as a friend open to enticement. While his 
Majesty’s G overnm ent at Halifax may have breathed m ore 
freely after Penobscot; the Yankees of Maine and 
Massachusetts did not. They had experienced stinging 
defeat upon the battlefield, had seen the illusion of an 
“independen t” Nova Scotia shattered, and now many of 
them  and their families suffered indignities at the hands 
o f the redcoats. Penobscot refugees left all their worldly 
belongings to trek through desolate woods to the 
Kennebec River in central Maine, begging for food as 
they w ent.49 T hose republicans who rem ained  in 
British-controlled Bagaduce felt even greater distresses. 
They found themselves conscripted to construct military 
posts for the redcoats, freely insulted by Loyalists, and 
almost totally lacking in supplies.50 Colonel Allan summed 
up the new Yankee attitude when he wrote o f his “feeling 
o f mortification for the Disgrace Brought on the Arms of 
O ur C ountry” by Penobscot.51
Beginning in the spring of 1780, the New Englanders, 
reflecting a new mood o f bitterness and frustration, lashed 
out at their northern  neighbor. Sullen patriots began 
to wonder if wartime visitors from  Nova Scotia were 
not in reality British spies. T he Massachusetts General 
Court passed a resolution forbidding the issuance of 
safe-conduct passes to Nova Scotia settlers who had 
previously carried on an illegal trade with the New 
England colony.52 Yankee m ariners who had once 
welcomed Nova Scotia vessels entering Boston H arbor 
now seized them .53 T he New England press kept alive 
a spirit of retribution by printing tales o f British 
m istreatm ent o f American prisoners and sympathizers in
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Nova Scotia."14 T he republicans, seeking revenge, cast 
angry eyes upon the agents of the crown in the northern  
province and sought an effective weapon from their 
depleted arsenal.
Nova Scotia seemed controlled firmly by the British. 
Lord George Germain undoubtedly expressed the view 
of most English adm inistrators when he inform ed the 
Halifax governm ent that royal control of Bagaduce had 
resulted in "effectual Protection to Nova Scotia against the 
New England Rebels.”55 Secretary Cxermain proved a poor 
prophet. In the spring of 1780 New England privateers 
once again appeared  in full force o ff the Nova Scotia coast. 
In addition to increasing their attacks upon vessels on the 
open seas, the) tu rned  m ore and more to preying upon 
small vessels supposedly safe in the shelter of rivers, inlets 
or town harbors. As the war drew to a close, the intruders 
dared on occasion to cut out vessels supposedly secure in 
well-fortified Halifax H arbor.5*1 Additional!v, the resilient 
Yankees raided such im portant coastal communities as 
Annapolis and Lunenburg, plundering the settlers and 
taking prisoners for ransom .57 T he Nova Scotia Assembly 
summ arized the disastrous effect that the brigands 
inflicted upon  the provincial econonn when they 
petitioned the king for a reduction in taxes:
They Humbly beg Leave to represent to your Majesty [they declared in 
1782], that they h a \e  in a variet\ o f Instances Shar’d the Calannities of 
the present unhappy war, that their Coasting Trade has been entirely 
Stopp'd and their Foreign Comm erce (almost in its Infancy) destroy’d 
by the Enemy, their Coasts and internal Settlem ents and Ba\s and 
Rivers p lu n d e r’d and ravaged by a Merciless Banditti.5*
A major goal of G reat Britain in em barking upon an 
invasion of Penobscot had been the curtailm ent o f Yankee 
privateers, who had proven especially active in Nova Scotia 
waters. In this aim they failed: while a decrease in
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privateering did occur along the colony’s coast during and 
after the Bagaduce campaign, the decline provided only 
the briefest of breathing spells.
Several factors contributed to the pause in maritime 
harassm ent. In the first place, all available arm ed vessels 
and m ariners in Massachusetts had been impressed into 
the Penobscot fleet. The Bay State, which hitherto had 
sent the most Yankee raiders in northern  waters, had laid 
down a forty-day em bargo on the em ploym ent o f seamen 
on vessels other than those destined for Bagaduce.59 
A rm ed vessels, which had only recently preyed upon Nova 
Scotia shipping, had received strict orders to escort 
A m erican tran sp o rts  to Penobscot.60 Secondly, at 
Penobscot itself, Massachusetts lost a staggering num ber 
o f commissioned arm ed vessels, virtually the entire state 
navy, including fifteen of its finest privateers.61 After this 
setback many New Englanders hesitated to risk further 
possible losses by fitting out new craft immediately. 
Thirdly, those m ariners who did challenge fate by 
continuing their privateering activities found the season 
working against them. T he Penobscot campaign reached 
its disastrous conclusion in mid-August of 1779. When 
Septem ber arrived, it brought with it turbulent weather 
and violent seas. Privateering stagnated during the 
autum n and winter m onths as shrewd Yankee skippers 
refused to pu t out to sea.
T he present writer wishes to offer the interpretation 
that the suspension o f downeast privateering in the fall of 
1779 was, in the main, a seasonal phenom enon which most 
likely would have come about regardless of Collier’s 
impressive victory in Penobscot Bay. Undoubtedly, the 
m ariners o f Massachusetts and Maine found themselves 
pinched for funds, vessels and resolution following the 
debacle. But patriotism  mixed with profit can surm ount 
the most impressive stumbling block. Privateers were 
usually private arm ed  craft ra th e r  than  state o r
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Continental vessels whose crews pu t out to sea for prize 
money, not wages. T he seamen of New England and the 
m erchants who still gave them  financial backing had long 
since discovered the easy riches that the exposed colony 
of Nova Scotia offered to their small privateers, known 
as coasters, which eluded the bulky British men-of-war 
by dodging in and out o f coves, creeks and rivers.62 
Moreover, the appearance o f a French fleet in New 
England waters in 1780, a result o f the Franco-American 
Alliance, forced squadrons of the Royal Navy to leave the 
Halifax station in pursuit of His Most Christian Majesty’s 
warships.63 Yankee seamen soon realized that many Nova 
Scotia coastal com munities again lacked an effective shield 
against attack.
T hat the flood of New England privateering did recede 
for the half-year following Bagaduce is not disputed. “T he 
spirit of privateering,” a Loyalist new spaper in New York 
observed in January  1780, “is much on the decline to the 
eastward . . .The adventurers in that way upon the whole 
have nothing to boast of.”64 While this Tory perception 
was accurate for the winter m onths o f 1779-80, it should 
be noted that the decrease in maritime assaults “to the 
eastward” occurred not only after Penobscot but for most 
of the long winters o f the Revolution, as is evidenced by 
the greatly-reduced Notices o f Libel appearing in the 
Yankee press. These new spaper advertisem ents, required 
by maritim e law for the lucky privateersm an wishing 
to take his prize into admiralty court for probable 
condem nation, provided inform ation regarding the prize, 
m aster and lading; the captor; and the place and date of 
trial. Weekly papers such as the Boston Gazette printed not 
only the libel announcem ents for the Boston maritime 
court but also the Notices o f Libel for the Southern District 
of Massachusetts, whose court convened in Plymouth, and 
the Eastern District, whose court met in Maine. Although 
the Boston court proved by far the most active o f the
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Yankee prize courts, the Boston Gazette at times even 
reported  libels for neighboring Rhode Island and New 
H am pshire. In  m id-sum m er, at the height of the 
privateering season, these notices included m ore than fifty 
prizes reported  in a single issue of the Gazette. With the 
stormy drift toward winter, however, the advertisem ents 
became a trickle.65
If  privateersm en from  Massachusetts and Maine lacked 
prizes to libel during  the winter months, they also had 
little need for commissions, issued by the Massachusetts 
governm ent and required before a cruise. Boston officials 
issued commissions to both privateers and letters of 
m arque, the latter being arm ed vessels authorized not only 
to take prizes but also to carry freight. While Bay State 
authorities granted  over two h u n d red  commissions 
between January  1, 1779 and October 31, 1779, they gave 
only about sixty licenses between November 1, 1779 and 
April 1, 1780. T he drop  in commissions was not only an 
outcome of Penobscot but a timely autum n occurrence. 
From  January  1, 1778 to October 31, 1778, the New 
Englanders issued approxim ately 225 commissions; 
during  the next six months, however, they gave out only 
seventy permits. In  spite of the British success at 
Bagaduce, the Yankees of Massachusetts consigned about 
240 certificates between January  1, 1780 and October 31, 
1780; in the next half-year, however, they issued only 
seventy commissions.66 Clearly, New England raiders were 
moved to stay in port as much by rough seas and savage 
gales as by naval battles won and lost.
T he British themselves recognized the seasonal decline 
by releasing captured American m ariners as winter 
approached, thereby reducing expenses and incon­
venience for the crown. T he lieutenant-governor of Nova 
Scotia, Sir Andrew Snape Ham m ond, for instance, 
followed this course in the autum n of 1781. “As the Season
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for privateering is now over," he confidently inform ed his 
superiors on November 25, "I am sending away the 
prisoners before the winter sets in."H7 Whitehall officials 
saw wisdom in H am m ond’s policy. From London 
Secretary o f State W elbore Ellis felt moyed to write the 
Halifax official that he thought the contrivance of sum m er 
im prisonm ent in the Halifax gaol with the promise of 
autum n em ancipation a "prudent" m easure.“K
T he in terruption  in downeast m aritim e incursions 
which came on the heels of the British victory at Penobscot 
lasted no longer than the seasonal respites that Sir Andrew 
Snape H am m ond and o ther British officials had come to 
depend upon. Impressive as the trium ph was, it does not 
appear to have gained any meaningf ul reprieve for a Nova 
Scotia wracked by Yankee freebooters. T he presence of 
men-of-war and Loyalist privateers fitting out of New 
Ireland also did not provide much com fort for the 
province, which endured  the harshest raids of the war 
after Penobscot.
Following the battle, the redcoats at Bagaduce pursued 
a strategy as circumspect as that of L ieutenant-G overnor 
Ham m ond. A larm ed at their growing losses elsewhere in 
North America, they did not build up their forces at 
Penobscot, which they held until the end of the Revolu­
tion in o rd er to tighten their vise against Machias. 
Nevertheless, the counterstroke of Maclean and Collier 
was a brilliant victory, destroying a Revolutionary fleet, an 
American ground force and a num ber of reputations. For 
the Yankees of Massachusetts, the chief result of the 
campaign was failure to dislodge the Britons from a 
military base within striking distance of Boston. To the 
men of Maine, Penobscot was a watershed which con­
cluded, once and for all, downeast illusions about the 
liberation or conquest of a northern  neighbor. For Nova 
Scotia settlers, however, the decline in privateering in their
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waters which followed the Penobscot expedition proved to 
be the calm which preceded the storm  as well as the calm 
which followed the storm.
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